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Totality and Infinity, Alterity, and 
Relation 
From Levinas to Glissant1 
Bernadette Cailler 
University of Florida 
Totality and Infinity, the title of a well-known work by Emmanuel Levinas, 
takes up a word which readers of Poetic Intention and of many other texts of 
Édouard Glissant’s will easily recognize: a term sometimes used in a sense 
that is clearly positive, sometimes in a sense that is not quite as positive, 
such as when, for instance, he compares “totalizing Reason” to the 
“Montaigne’s tolerant relativism.”2 In his final3 collection of essays, Traité du 
tout-monde, Poétique IV, Glissant attempts one more time to clarify the sense 
in which the reader will have to understand his use of the word “totality,” 
thinking, and rightfully so, that this word might lead to some confusion: “To 
write is to say the world. The world as totality, which is so dangerously 
close to the totalitarian.”4 Of course, here, it will be necessary to try to 
ascertain whether or not Levinas’s totality and Glissant’s can peacefully 
coexist, or, rather, whether this word might, in Glissant, have opposite 
meanings. Where the second word is concerned, “infinity,” any reader of 
Glissant will know that he locates its source in those societies he calls 
atavistic, which are grounded in foundational texts that are the bearers of 
stories of filiation, of legitimacy, societies whose arrogance and whose errors 
the author never ceases to decry and whose decomposition, in the very times 
in which we live, he never ceases to announce (even as Glissant recognizes 
that there was a time when atavistic cultures undoubtedly must have 
experienced their own period of creolization, and that, conversely, 
composite cultures undoubtedly often tend to become atavistic).5 On this 
level, “totality” and “infinity,” for him, seem to belong to the same world. 
Thus, and still in Traité du tout-monde , he proposes that 
Hebraism, Christianity, Islam are grounded in the same spirituality 
of the One and to the same belief in a revealed Truth… The thought 
of the One that has done so much to magnify, as well as to 
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denature. How can one consent to this thought, which transfigures 
while neither offending nor de-routing the Diverse?6 
Moreover, it would be interesting, I think, to know how Levinas might react 
to these words of Glissant’s: “Totality is not that which has often been called 
the universal. It is the finite and realized quantity of the infinite detail of the 
real.” This word, “infinite,” is decidedly dangerous: what is an “infinite 
detail?” Does this word, “infinite,” not always lead to the unknown, to the 
non-totalizable, to what Levinas would call an “enigma,” to what Glissant 
would call an “opacity”? 
 Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Levinas’s Infinite belongs to a 
metaphysical dimension that Glissant, on a certain level, would not accept. 
And yet… We know that Levinas–weary of Descartes’s solitary Cogito, 
Levinas, who therefore refused that being might be reduced to thought–
grounds his notion of alterity in this “idea of infinity” which, he notes, 
“designates a relation with a being that maintains its total exteriority with 
respect to him who thinks it.” Here Levinas also gives his famous definition 
of the face: “The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea 
of the other in me, we here name the face.”7 I sincerely doubt that, here, 
Glissant would take issue with Levinas’s words. Nor do I believe that he 
would disagree with Levinas when the latter describes subjectivity as 
“welcoming the Other, as hospitality,”8 or notes that the relation between 
the Same and the Other, which is established through language, is the locus 
of an “ethical” relation wherein the strangeness (étrangeté) of an Autrui 
irreducible to the Moi is affirmed: a relation “whose terms do not form a 
totality.”9 
 Here, I will simply attempt to explain how, having read it in 
conjunction with Levinas’s meditations, Glissant’s work took on for me a 
new urgency. It should not be forgotten, should the association of the two 
appear risky from the onset, that both thinkers adopt a critical and 
passionate stance toward the West. And I would also add that if Levinas’s 
insistence on distinguishing his philosophy from his theology often seems 
excessive, given the importance in his work of the foundational Hebraic 
texts, it must nonetheless be noted that the Hebraism10/Christianity/Islam 
block to which Glissant, for his part, refers has a number of fissures, and 
that, moreover, we undoubtedly owe it to Levinas to read him as a highly 
independent voice, as a distinctive voice. 
 The French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, who was of Jewish 
culture and of Lithuanian origin, passed away in December of 1995; he thus 
lived through the twentieth century.11 The thought of Levinas was informed 
by his reading of the Scriptures, including the rabbinic commentaries–
writings that are profoundly anchored 1) in an oral tradition that was 
recorded quite late, 2) in texts that remain open to discussion, to teaching, to 
dialogue.12 Rooted as it was in the cultural memory of the Jews of the 
B e r n a d e t t e  C a i l l e r  |  1 3 7  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XIX, No 1 (2011)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.483 
Diaspora, the thought of Emmanuel Levinas emphasizes the Ethical and a 
constant meditation on Alterity.13 The question of anti-Semitism, the tragedy 
of the Holocaust, obviously weigh heavily on his approach. Finally, constant 
throughout his work is also a meditation on the relation between what he 
calls Jewish “prophetism” and the “Reason” of those worlds marked by their 
Greek heritage. Indeed, for Levinas, not only is Europe “the Bible and the 
Greeks,”14 traditions that inform his philosophy, but one might also wonder 
if, for him, other traditions have any intellectual import. In his interviews 
with François Poirié, he would go so far as to say: “I sometimes say: man is 
Europe and the Bible, and everything else can be found in them.”15 As far as 
I can tell, there is no trace, in his work, of what Martin Bernal called “black 
Athens.” Nor does he linger on the “common background of the Greek and 
Hebraic civilizations,” to paraphrase the title of a book published by Cyrus 
Gordon.16 Without dwelling on this here, we must note that as many, now 
famous, studies show, the relation between the Greek heritage, the Hebraic 
world and, in addition to those, Africa, must in fact be conceived as a 
network of contaminations reaching far back in time. But apart from a few 
references to Lévy-Bruhl and Lévi-Strauss, the reader will to my knowledge 
find no traces in Levinas of an interaction with, or a questioning of, African 
cultures, Amerindian cultures, or other cultures, even if a Humanism of the 
Other – the title of one his works – is everywhere recognized by him, even if 
the emergence, the arising, on the contemporary scene of peoples from the 
so-called Third World are here and there acknowledged;17 even if, above all, 
Levinas’s philosophy, like Glissant’s, amounts to a putting-into-question of 
Western Ontology. Thus, pursuing an approach he had adopted as a young 
man, he writes in Of God Who Comes to Mind: 
We wonder whether the human, considered from the starting point 
of ontology as freedom, as will to power and as assuming in its 
totality and its finitude the essance of being…if the human, 
considered from the starting point of the ontiology to which is 
subordinated, and on which is founded, and from which it would 
derive, and wherein would reside, European philosophy’s law and 
its moral and political obedience and all that the Bible seemed to 
bring to it – we wonder whether this humanity is still equal to that 
which in human deficiency strikes the modern intelligence. Modern 
intelligence is that which saw, in Auschwitz, the outcome 
(aboutissement) of law and obedience – flowing from the heroic act – 
in the totalitarianisms, fascist and nonfascist, of the twentieth 
century.18 
A little farther in the text, he comments upon “the fiasco of the human 
appears to us to arise in the extension of a certain exaltation of the Same, of 
the Identical, of Activity, and of Being…”19 Levinas’s novel philosophy, in 
which ethics is not a branch of philosophy, but the “first philosophy,”20 is 
thus inscribed within a progression in which Levinas breaks with a tradition 
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that, from Plato to Hegel, brought the Other back to the Same in a 
“phenomenology of l’être distinguished from l’étant,” by the same token 
subordinating human relations to the “knowledge-power” of a totalizing, 
perhaps even totalitarian, thought.21 As Derrida once noted in a memorable 
essay, as early as 1930, “La sortie de Grèce” had been “discretely 
premeditated in Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology”22 and had 
been carried forward through a critical examination of Heidegger, who, 
according to Levinas, continues to affirm the priority of “Being in relation to 
beings.” Levinas’s thought, wrote Derrida, makes one aware that 
… to renounce the other (not by being weaned from it, but by 
detaching oneself from it, which is actually to be in relation to it, to 
respect it while nevertheless overlooking it, that is, while knowing 
it, identifying it, assimilating it), to renounce the other is to enclose 
oneself within solitude (the bad solitude of solidity and self-
identity) and to repress ethical transcendence.23 
This is to practice a philosophy of power and, ultimately, of violence. This 
totality from which Levinas – who choses the infinite – distances himself is 
also, I believe, that from which Glissant is escaping, in his vision of the tout-
monde. A concrete truth, an awakening to the Other through the bonjour, a 
bénédiction precede all thought, precede any grasp of the self and of the 
world, as Levinas would say: the self is not substance, but response and 
responsibility. Derrida’s recent homage to Levinas in his Adieu is thus 
centered around what Derrida – paraphrasing certain texts of Levinas’s, 
most notably Totality and Infinity and Beyond the Verse – calls “the messianic 
politics of hospitality” for the stranger, the marginal, the “naked migrant,” 
as Glissant might say,24 all of these métèques, barbarians, immigrants, whose 
faces Julia Kristeva also sketches in one of her works.25 We know the 
approach Levinas adopts in his analysis of the dialogue between the Moi and 
the Toi in Martin Buber,26 which consists of a leap out of narcissistic fusion, 
out of this circle wherein the Other is swallowed by the One. If, among other 
readings, Levinas’s reading of Buber allows him to explore the fecundity of 
this relation in his theory of the welcome, this reading also allows the notion 
of asymmetrical alterity to shine forth.27 Such a notion implies not only a 
position of height, a position of mastery (position seigneuriale) so to speak, of 
the Other with respect to the Moi, but also the constant presence of a Tiers or 
of many Tiers between the Moi and the Toi-Autre, for the Other is, in turn, the 
Other for an Other, for multiple Others. 
The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other – language is 
justice. It is not that there first would be the face, and then the being 
it manifests or expresses would concern himself with justice; the 
epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity. The face in its 
nakedness as a face presents to me the destitution of the poor one 
and the stranger.28 
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Moreover, loyal as he is to the Torah and the Talmud, Levinas nevertheless 
remains open to the best moments, to the best pages, found in Christianity. 
As we know, he did not hesitate to offer his contribution to multiple 
meetings of various faiths. He liked to note, indirectly and subtly, that the 
best of Christianity could be found in the words of Matthew 25 – “I was a 
stranger and you welcomed me, I needed clothes and you clothed me...” – 
for he saw in those words an echo of the Jew’s essential duty to the widow, 
to the orphan, to the stranger, and to the poor.29 Still, Levinas, in the entirety 
of his work, remains firm in his affirmation of the feeling of strangeness he 
felt with respect to Christianity, while remaining conscious, of course, of the 
way in which the history of European civilization and of his own philosophy 
cannot be detached from it. With the exception, also, of the idea of the Cross 
as an image of human suffering, as well as of the help certain Christians 
afforded to persecuted Jews. Thus, in a 1934 text, one can read: 
We pass by the Cross; we do not head toward it. But we do not 
experience this sacred horror which the Tharaud brothers believed 
they had observed in a child of the Polish ghetto when we find 
ourselves in ‘the shadow of the Cross’ for an instant. And in a 
world that is increasingly hostile, that is filled with swastikas, it is to 
the Cross, with its straight and pure branches, that we often raise 
our eyes.30 
Certainly, his attitude, which is at once lenient and without 
compromise, is different from that of many African and Antillean writers we 
might think of, who are often, and in some cases profoundly, Christianized. 
Thus, Senghor’s position, which hopes for Africa that it “bring a supplement 
of soul” to tomorrow’s Civilization, entails a faith in Christianity, as well as, 
undoubtedly, an homage to Islam. And yet, on many occasions, Senghor 
spoke of his “animistic” childhood and of the symbiosis that had taken root 
in him.31 This position, which is no doubt shared by many Africans, appears 
to be quite close to that of Simone Weil, who believed that the non-Jewish 
religions of antiquity, and the non-Jewish, non-Muslim, non-Christian 
religions of modern times, with their multitude of myths, announced, 
announce, contained, contain, an intuitive grasp of the Divine. But for 
Levinas, who reminds us that in the Talmudic tradition, “a pagan who 
knows the Torah is the equal of the High Priest,”32 the symbiosis of which 
Senghor speaks would remain, properly-speaking, non-sensical. When 
Senghor describes traditional African religions, from which he does not feel 
himself to be purely and simply detached, he calls them “elaborate forms of 
magic” that bind the visible to the invisible in a manner that is properly 
“mystical.” And he adds that magic “animates all Negro-African social 
activities.”33 Such a universe is therefore far removed from that of Levinas, 
who denounces myths and idols, which can also be found in Christianity.34 
For him, God is “transcendent to the point of absence.” Without body, He is 
not merely “‘the ‘first other,’ or the ‘other par excellence,’ or the ‘absolutely 
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other,’ but other than the other, other otherwise, and other with an alterity 
prior to the alterity of the other, prior to the ethical obligation to the other 
and different from every neighbor…”35 The possibility of a rapprochement 
might seem more likely with Islam: readers of Cheikh Hamidou Kane will 
recall that one of the titles considered for Ambiguous Adventure was “God is 
not a parent.”36 There is little doubt that for many colonized Africans and 
their descendants, the degree of theological and dogmatic strangeness felt in 
Christianity might be difficult to measure, beyond an adhesion to certain 
practices. Even when the possibility of Jesus as mediator with the Divine is 
not entirely excluded, the Westernization of this Message remains suspect. 
Thus, the Congolese (Zairian) author Valentin Mudimbe, who, like Senghor, 
also received a Catholic education and was therefore quite “Latinized,” 
noted, in L’Odeur du Père, that the Word of Jesus Christ brought to Africa by 
the missionaries was not that of an “original” Jesus, but of a Jesus 
“encultured” in a conquering West sure of its reason. From this perspective, 
then, he wrote: “I do not see what the African theologian or priest has to say 
to me. I affirm my irreducibility in the face of their existence, and would 
expect the same from them.”37 On the other hand, in a recent, semi-
autobiographical work entitled Les Corps glorieux des mots et des êtres. Esquisse 
d’un jardin africain à la bénédictine, Mudimbe refused to exclude the 
possibility of a connection to the Christian adventure.38 Lastly, one can 
doubt the notion that “faith,” as well as a thorough study of a religious 
tradition, animate the works of authors such as Césaire or Glissant, without 
excluding the possible importance in those same authors, or in other authors 
from the Africa/Antilles sphere, of their respective religious heritages; 
without, of course, eliding from their writings the passages in which they 
denounce the caricatures or betrayals of religious ideals (thus, see Jacques 
Roumain, Césaire, Tchicaya U Tam’Si, Ousmane Sembène…).39 With respect 
to Glissant, there is no need to reiterate the extent to which he is suspicious 
of the idea of a revealed Truth, of a Verb that would function as written 
Law, and moreover, as he would once more note in Traité du tout-monde,40 
the extent to which he rejected the “image of the Greek-Latin Negro,” even 
as he praised, in his beautiful homage to Senghor, the fact that the latter was 
able to connect the African song-poem (woy) to the Greek ode, words 
Glissant characterized as “the most profound Western man has ever 
uttered.”41 But in reality, Albert Memmi’s resounding “alas, God does not 
exist!,” in Ce que je crois42 – a God in the image of that single Truth/Law 
Glissant rejects – takes its place in a philosophy of life that is not so different 
from that of Levinas, who has little patience for the Christian wait for a 
reward in the hereafter in exchange for “good deeds” accomplished here 
below; Levinas, for whom the just, the saints are those who do good, as 
atheists would or could, as if God did not exist, and who place the life, the 
hunger, of the other above their own lives, their own hunger, their own 
salvation.43 The caution with which Levinas dissuades anyone from accusing 
another of “materialism,” when this other is the one who is hungry and who 
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is suffering from social injustices, undoubtedly directs one’s attention to the 
complex and bumpy ties that exist between many Antillean texts and 
Marxism (Jacques Roumain, Césaire, Senghor, Depestre, Frantz Fanon, 
Glissant himself).44 In the Judaic tradition lauded by Levinas, only a human 
being can forgive a human being. God cannot erase the fault committed by 
one human being against another. To Levinas, that the face of the Other–a 
face that is most often suffering, and always separate, distant–reveals the 
Divine, or, as we called above, the “Infinite,” became obvious quite early. He 
would eventually add the following words to an article he had written in 
1934: 
We must ask whether liberalism is sufficient for the authentic 
dignity of the human subject. Does the subject attain the human 
condition prior to accepting responsibility for the other in the 
Election that lifts him up to this level? An election that comes from 
a god–or from God–that sees him in the face of the other, his fellow 
man, the original ‘locus’ of Revelation.45 
For the Jew he is, God is one with the “You shall not murder” of his 
Word.46 In this homage to the Word can no doubt be found points of 
convergence with the old teachings of the African oral tradition, as well as, 
perhaps, the sketch of the charismatic Césairean leader who has nothing but 
his word and his desire to change life: “and I say/and my word is peace…;” 
“my speech is my only weapon, I speak and I awaken… I speak and, 
attacking oppression and servitude at their base, I make possible, for the first 
time, I make fraternity possible!”47 One must nevertheless ask what 
becomes, in many Negritude texts–which are a dialectical response to the 
murderous negation of the Other by one who purports to be, who believes 
himself to be, who thinks himself to be, all that there is–of this 
transcendental idea of the “face,” which gives rise to both the prohibition to 
murder and its possibility, but also from which any Senghorian idea of a 
quasi-mystical fusion between the gaze and its object is banished.48 When 
reading some of Senghor’s key texts, for instance, the attentive reader will 
see that, in his exaltation of “Negro emotion” in contrast with “Hellenic 
reason.” “Hellenic reason,” (which remains more or less intact even in his 
quite recent Liberté 5. Le Dialogue des cultures [1993]), Senghor lays out, to 
begin with, a philosophy of Being: Ethics – which is important in its 
portrayal of African culture – remains a branch of philosophy. Even though 
one’s reading of those pages describing the communal spirit of traditional 
African societies might make it seem as though Senghor were aligned with 
Levinas and his theory of the welcome – wherein the host becomes the 
Other’s ‘hostage,’ the Other’s captive49 – his exposition of one’s knowledge 
(connaissance) of the Other, in the form of the human being or of nature, 
might lead one to believe that Africans are all mystics lost in communion, in 
participation, in ecstasy. At this point, the alterity Levinas describes 
disappears. To be sure, if Sartre’s famous phrase in “Black Orpheus” – ”to 
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use Heidegger’s language, negritude is the Negro’s being-in-the-world”50 – 
ushers Negritude into a philosophical sphere marked by post-Hegelian 
phenomenology, and thus contemporaneous with Levinas’s meditations, the 
danger of narcissistic suffocation remains. 
 Senghor’s brother in Negritude, Aimé Césaire, also makes use, in 
certain places in his poetic texts (especially in his early writings), of these 
images of the man-tree, “abandoned”, “grasped”, “by the essence of all 
things”;51 in those moments, he appears to be following his African elder’s 
path. Nevertheless, as Ronnie Scharfman showed so well, if it is true that 
binary relations can be found throughout Césaire’s poetry, these relations 
are quite complex, fluid, unstable, constitutive of the subject itself. In her 
conclusion, in which she takes up once again her analysis of the “subject” in 
Césaire, Scharfman writes: 
The subject cannot know itself, indeed cannot articulate itself 
poetically without positing a relationship of otherness… The 
relationship can function positively, permitting the subject to 
identify itself personally, poetically, and communally. Or this 
relationship can function negatively, revealing the ways in which 
the subject is alienated, inhibiting it from establishing itself as an 
integrated unity in language and history. But these two functions 
relate dialectically, informing each other and transcending each 
other, rotating slightly in each poem so as to expose a (sic) different 
dramatis personae.”52 
One could say that in Césaire, the subject can only ever be in relation to 
another. Moreover, two dimensions of Césaire’s discourse bring his work 
closer to that of Levinas, insofar as it simultaneously entails 1) the fraternity 
brought about by a community of suffering, beyond any ethnic or cultural 
differences, and 2) a political and ethical engagement in which the voice of a 
“reasonable” discourse can indeed be heard.53 One could see a possible 
common ground, here, between Levinas, Césaire, and Glissant – for whom, 
as we know, the relation with the other is “interred in the suffering of the 
transported”54 – were Glissant’s reluctance to inscribe the concept of 
“relation” within morality and the “election” not so striking. Recall this clear 
assertion in the recent Traité du Tout-Monde: “In so far as Relation is a-moral, 
it does not elect.”55 If Levinas’s Ethics were purely and simply a moralizing 
ethics, which I do not believe, then it would be impossible for these two 
great 20th century thinkers to converge. While I cannot expound on this 
idea, Glissant’s leap out of Hegel’s house and away from a discourse of the 
“Greek-Latin Negro” appears to me to be of a kind with the leap through 
which Levinas’s distances himself from totalitarian totality and clears the 
way for alterity/relation. In Glissant’s theories of the “poetics of relation” – 
recently taken up in the beautiful works already mentioned, Introduction à 
une poétique du divers (a title that is, of course, inspired by Ségalen) and 
Traité du Tout-Monde – Levinas’s notion of an asymmetrical alterity seems to 
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me to have the potential to be fully developed. In these texts, true 
divergences from the dominant discourses begin to take shape, as Mudimbe 
describes so well in, amongst others, his collection of essays entitled The 
Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and Power of Knowledge (1988), even if 
we ought to keep in mind that the Antillean discourse cannot be conflated 
with the African discourse Mudimbe discusses. The latter’s inquiries and 
words reach far. They suggest that even the contemporary African and 
Africanist discourses, discourses of revolt against the grasp of the West on 
Africa, are inscribed within the gears of the development of Western 
philosophy and methods of knowledge; are inscribed, for that matter, within 
what Levinas would call the bad conscience 20th century Europe 
experienced with respect to its own philosophy, to its own History. And 
Mudimbe poses what remains, to me, an essential question, namely, how to 
escape the vicious circles in which African and Africanist discourses are 
caught, so as to reveal “the chose du texte,” what he calls “the primordial 
African discourse, in its variety and simplicity.”56 This challenge posed to 
the dominant discourses necessarily entails, as I am trying to show in this 
paper, a different approach to alterity. As I noted earlier, the concept of 
asymmetrical alterity of which Levinas writes precludes, on the one hand, 
any imprisonment within a métissage in which either one or the other finds 
herself denied, assimilated, crushed, and, on the other, any imprisonment 
within the simple relation to the Toi. As such, it is an attitude that not only 
assures an opening to the “Tout-Monde,” as Glissant would say,57 but also 
functions as a safeguard against the injustices and blindness which might 
arise from a love for, a devotion to, a single race, people, land, ancestor, 
culture, or memory. This philosophy is rich in lessons that serve to counter 
the racisms and sexisms which characterize those areas where the histories 
of the former Colonizer and the former Colonized clash. Lessons through 
which one comes to understand that respect for the other person requires a 
vision of “difference” that goes far beyond what the geographical 
environment and “culture” have created: while “difference” and “relation,” 
in their everyday senses, are a consequence of History, alterity, on the other 
hand, is truly what makes human beings human, and it could, should, will 
establish the abolition of all massacres, of all oppression, perpetrated in the 
name of “difference.” This observation makes the adventure upon which so 
many Colonizers and Colonized so dangerously embarked all the more 
tragic. This observation also forces us to inscribe any discourse (toute parole) 
within the “infinite detail of the real,” that dream of measurelessness (la 
démesure) that animates Glissant: 
I dream of a new approach, a new appreciation of literature, of 
literature as a discovery of the world, as a discovery of the Tout-
Monde. I think that all peoples today have an important role to play 
in the non-system of relations of the Tout-Monde, and that a people 
that lacks the means to think about this function is indeed an 
oppressed people, a people that is kept in a state of infirmity. Thus, 
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I dream, since I am a writer, I dream of a new approach to literature 
in this excess that is the Tout-Monde.”58 
To this day, the extraordinary architecture of Glissant’s œuvre, 
including novels, poems, and plays, portrays a world in which the actual 
and potential greatness and flaws of Negritude emerge, mature, are 
transcended, then opened up to an Other, both within the text and within 
life. Hence the figure of the Leader-Messiah, that of the Césairean hero, of 
whom Glissant subtly denied that it could “be the mouth of misfortunes that 
have no mouths”59 – it would be impossible, he states, for us to be the voice 
for those without a voice, “in that we are but a part of their voices”60 – the 
figure of the Leader-Messiah, then, continues to haunt the legend of the 
Negator in which a new epic of the Conqueror, a new totalizing discourse–a 
totality so close to totalitarian, Glissant might say–ran the risk (if falsely) of 
taking root: a giant with feet of clay. It is Levinas, still, who noted that “the 
negator and the negated are posited together, form a system, that is, a 
totality.”61 Glissant’s work, in its developments, in reality shows that a 
quasi-Hegelian philosophy of the Negator will be upended by the force of 
relations; an œuvre that, as I stated in a book devoted to Glissant, slowly 
“metaphorizes the subversion of a Novel of the Negator…” By that, I meant, 
of course, that it metaphorizes the progressive disintegration of what could 
have become a Novel of the Negator: a text that subverts its own 
subversion.62 Upon the publication of Mahagony (1987), the author’s fifth 
novel and a text that is in my opinion crucial for a “poetics of relation,” I 
continued to unearth the traps the author has for many years set for the 
philosophies of totality, that old totality, those philosophies of binarism and 
of “difference,” noting, though I used different words, the constant and 
increasing presence of various “tiers” – keepers of alterity – in Glissant’s 
discourse.63 Therefore, whenever Glissant speaks of “Creolization,” the 
opposition of “the difficult complexion of a relation identity” to a “single 
root identity,”64 he does not mean Senghor’s old métissage – even if the latter, 
with this concept, purports to be moving beyond a binary métissage of the 
West and of Africa. The Creolization imagined by Glissant, beyond any false 
synthesis, entails, a priori, the Levinasian idea of rupture, of exteriority, 
coupled with the idea of the unforeseeable, of the unknown, another 
Levinasian term. It is the locus of a subject in a state of insomnia, a subject 
always on the lookout. Glissant expressed it thus: 
What happened in the Caribbean, which can be summarized with 
the term creolization, gives us a more or less complete idea of the 
process of Relation: not only a meeting, a shock, a cultural 
métissage, but a heretofore unseen dimension that allows one to be 
here and elsewhere, rooted and open, lost in the mountains and 
free upon the sea, in harmony and exiled.65 
The consequences of such a project are far-reaching. Nevertheless, we 
should consider the many passages in which Glissant notes that the texts–
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and the realities– of the contemporary Relation arose on a historical and 
cultural ground from which the “foundational texts,” he proposes, have 
disappeared.66 The Levinasian conception of the relation with Autrui–rooted 
in a foundational text–challenges, it seems to me, Glissant’s overly-
categorical premise, without in any way weakening the Martinican poet-
philosopher’s “prophetic” vision. If the post-Freudian conception of the 
subject, now “stranger to itself” (Kristeva) could already be found on several 
levels of the texts of Negritude – the works of poets and works of alienated 
people – for Glissant and Levinas, extraneity is not only interior to the 
subject; it concerns the very dwelling (l’habitation) of the subject, who is 
destined to be a nomad, a visitor, upon a land graciously lent out. I think 
Levinas would be in full agreement with Glissant when the latter denounces 
the use of foundational myths in granting a community the right to 
“consider the land it inhabits, which has become a territory, as absolutely its 
own.”67 I would like to note here that Levinas liked to cite this word of 
Pascal’s: “‘There lies my place in the sun’: There lie the beginning and the 
image of the usurpation of the earth entire.” Herein, then, the obsession of 
the root, of the “native” land that must be defended, disappears; herein the 
messianic City (Cité) appears. No longer is the native land the brass idol; it 
becomes impregnable Jerusalem, whose inhabitant, through his very 
hospitality, by offering up his home, is no longer master of the earth and 
where the stranger continues to be the beloved, the messenger, of God/the 
gods. This idea of a native land is akin, it seems to me, to what Glissant calls 
the “place (lieu)” from which one emits speech (la parole) – not a territory 
stifled by fortifications, but an immense “area:” a “place,” in reality, freed of 
the “superstitions of the Place” which Levinas denounced;68a conception of 
“place” that includes a most skeptical attitude with respect to filiation and 
legitimacy. At this point, all subjects of writing are possible, including, and 
especially, the forsaking, Glissant would say, of the “proud story” of cultural 
pseudo-histories (pseudo-mémoires),69 a story that alienates more often than 
it liberates. But we can go even further. In the “creolized” works of this 
nascent 21st century, the native isle, the village, the ancestor himself, may no 
longer need to be named in order to nourish speech. Questions of cultural 
nationalism, of national literature, of language are displaced, seen in a novel 
light. Henceforth, the writer is immersed in multilingualism, which does not 
mean, as Glissant would say, that he abandons his native language/s, or that 
he necessarily speaks or writes in different languages, but that the language 
and culture of the other, other languages and cultures, are always there in 
their multiple resonances, indispensable, and infusing his own cultural 
expression, in one way or another.70 Hence, too, the increasing interest 
shown in “foreign” literatures, in “translations,” in “interpretations,” 
beyond the sphere of Francophony, the Antilles, Africa. Reading Patrick 
Chamoiseau’s splendid literary vignettes in this context, which can be found 
in his recent Ecrire en pays dominé (1997) and which he calls 
“sentimenthèque,” it is as though there erupted from this vibrant Antillean 
1 4 6  |  T o t a l i t y  a n d  I n f i n i t y ,  A l t e r i t y ,  a n d  R e l a t i o n  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XIX, No 1 (2011)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.483 
heart/place re-appropriations, rehabilitations of texts, born of a gaze that is 
other. One could also refer to the astounding study of William Faulkner that 
Glissant recently published, a work presaged, it should be said, by many of 
his previous writings. Faulkner, who long inhabited the “clearing” of his 
words – as Glissant himself said of Saint-John Perse’s presence in his own 
work – Faulkner, who made possible a number of maturations in the 
Antillean poet’s progression within his own “lieu,” finds himself in turn 
infused with all of the Antillean wisdom born of that very place. Glissant’s 
own comings and goings, between the closed space (lieu clos) and the open 
border-place (lieu-frontière ouverte), make possible a thoroughly pertinent 
analysis of Faulkner, whose work puts into words, he writes, “the 
movement, the hesitation, the passage from the certainty of fixed identities 
and necessary truths to the spell cast by the possible and the impossible 
caught up in one another.”71 
 There remains in this adventure the danger of losing the language of 
“memory”– Hebrew, Arabic, Berber, Creole, Serer …; there remains that for 
some French-language writers, this language of memory is still the language 
of “the place,” of the power to say. In fact, this is a paradox on which such 
creative texts must often feed, if they are to be considered “good.” We 
would still have to ascertain whether the notion of peace invoked by 
Levinas’s meditations in Totality and Infinity, and of which Derrida describes 
so well the power and beauty in his Adieu, does not remain the dream of 
only a few rare spirits. This essay should be followed by another, which 
would analyze the adventures of the “poetics of relation” precisely with 
regard to this ethics of peace, in Antillean writings, certainly, but also in 
writings of the Maghreb and of sub-Saharan Africa. In this moment of 
human history, our own, a history aware it has witnessed the extermination 
of the Amerindians, the deportation and the enslavement of Africans, 
Colonization, the pogroms, the Holocaust, the tragedies of Palestine, 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda…, the shift called for by Levinas and Glissant might 
seem perfectly utopian: that peace, not war, come first; that to see the face of 
the Other is to answer to him, and to answer for him, rather than to kill him: 
“It is no longer necessary that I understand the other, that is, to reduce him 
to the model of my own transparency, in order to live with this other or to 
build something with him,” to cite a precious little passage of Glissant’s.72 To 
reduce the other to the model of my own transparency would be to live in 
accordance with the old totality which both Levinas and Glissant reject. Both 
would be the first to argue that utopia is necessary. It is Levinas, again, who 
reminds us that 2000 years of theoretical non-violence have failed to 
diminish the violence of a world profoundly marked by the Christian 
discourse, a world in which “charity” unfortunately often takes the place of 
justice. And yet, when all is said and done, what perhaps remains 
unanswered in the concept of Creolization described by Glissant is the 
question of whether or not the imperative of justice limits, can or should 
limit, Relation. Moreover, this reader somewhat regrets that the articulation–
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in truth, the opposition–of the concept of negative Totality and that of the 
Tout-Monde of which he dreams, is not more clearly established in his 
discourse. Let me repeat, these terms, totality, totalizing, in their alternate 
meanings, are not the happiest of terms; they are too open to equivocation, 
confronted as they are by the ever-open baroque richness of the texts.* 
 
                                                                
 
*Translation by David-Olivier Gougelet, in collaboration with Bernadette Cailler. NOTE: when English 
translations of French works are available, the existing English translations have been used and 
citations are given to both the French original and the translation. When English translations are not 
available, all translations into English by David-Olivier Gougelet and Bernadette Cailler. 
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